

# **THE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORWARD-DEPLOYED MAGTF IN A JOINT ENVIRONMENT**

**A MONOGRAPH**

**BY**

**Lieutenant Colonel Mastin M. Robeson  
United States Marine Corps**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff  
College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**AY 96-97**

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

19971107 037

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE

22 May 97

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED  
MONOGRAPH

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Operational Implications of the Forward-Deployed MAGTF in a Joint Environment

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

Lt Col Mastin M. Robeson USMC

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

School of Advanced Military Studies  
Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION  
REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

10. SPONSORING / MONITORING  
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE:  
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)  
SEE ATTACHED

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

14. SUBJECT TERMS

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

64

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
OF REPORT  
UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
OF THIS PAGE  
UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
OF ABSTRACT  
UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  
UNLIMITED


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Lieutenant Colonel Mastin M. Robeson, USMC


Title of Monograph: *The Operational Implications of the Forward-  
Deployed MAGTF in a Joint Environment*

Approved by:



Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Monograph Director



COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS

Director, School of  
Advanced Military  
Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate  
Degree Program

Accepted this 22d Day of May 1997

## ABSTRACT

THE OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORWARD-DEPLOYED MAGTF  
IN A JOINT ENVIRONMENT by Lieutenant Colonel Mastin M. Robeson, USMC, 44  
pages.

For over 200 years the United States has maintained a Navy/Marine team prepared to respond to crisis. During the 20th Century, Marine Corps structure continued to define its forward-deployed presence as an integral part of the national security strategy. This strategy of engagement and enlargement coupled with shrinking budgets, drawdown of forces, and increase in littoral flashpoints propelled the Navy/Marine team into a keystone role. Future U.S. response to hotspots will likely be in the form of CONUS based joint task forces. However, future joint operations will need to be more than mere multi-service deployments. Future joint operations must demonstrate true interoperability. The ability of these joint task forces to leverage the advantages of the forward-deployed MAGTF may be the difference between success and failure.

This monograph explains the background behind the MAGTF concept, and then examines the capabilities and operational implications of the most frequently used MAGTF, the MEU(SOC). The MEU's unique skills, equipment, and sea basing make it ideal for supporting a joint task force in a dangerous and uncertain littoral environment. The intended result is a document joint planners can use to determine what the MEU(SOC) offers, as well as specific ideas on how to best leverage this capability. This monograph provides answers for planners faced with integrating a forward-deployed MAGTF into joint operations.

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Chapter I - Naval Operating Forces.....	1
Chapter II - Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).....	10
Chapter III - Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable).....	16
Chapter IV - MEU(SOC) Capabilities.....	22
Chapter V - Joint Operations Applicability.....	33
Chapter VI - Conclusion.....	42
Appendix A - Abbreviations.....	A-1
Appendix B - MEU Organization.....	B-1
Appendix C - Twenty-One MEU(SOC) Missions.....	C-1
Appendix D - MEU vs MEF(FWD) Equipment Chart.....	D-1
Appendix E - Amphibious Ship Characteristics.....	E-1
Endnotes.....	45
Bibliography	

## CHAPTER ONE

### NAVAL FORCES

#### I. Introduction

In 1935, the United States (U.S.) had a small military, an economy in decline, and an isolationist view of the world. Within ten years, flush with victory from World War II, economically prosperous, and in sole possession of the atomic bomb; the United States was the most powerful nation on earth.<sup>1</sup> Fifty years later, U.S. world influence had driven the Soviet Union to bankruptcy, reducing the only other potential super power. This ended the communist dream and introduced the hopeful opportunity for democracy and free enterprise to much of the world. Such windows of opportunity are fleeting, usually requiring a catalyst if they are to be taken advantage of.

In the U.S. National Security Strategy of 1995, President William J. Clinton states that "with the end of the Cold War, the need for strong American leadership abroad is more necessary than ever."<sup>2</sup> In addition to offering new hope, the demise of the Soviet Union also removed restraints that, at least partially, had held world violence in check. This increase in unrest spurred the U.S. to assume increased responsibility. U.S. global interests and historic ideals compel it to oppose those who endanger the survival and well-being of peaceful neighbors.<sup>3</sup>

*Nations should be able to expect that their borders and their sovereignty will always be secure...we will, as American always has, use diplomacy when we can, but force if we must... Our nation can only address this era's dangers and opportunities if we remain actively engaged in global affairs.*<sup>4</sup>

William J. Clinton  
President of the United States

The national security strategy is based on containing and deterring threats to the U.S. and its allies, while enlarging the community of market democracies. This goal will likely increase U.S. global military presence in the coming decade.

Shrinking budgets and receding force structure work in opposite directions.<sup>5</sup> A smaller force structure means less range of coverage, particularly given U.S. past propensity for service operational competition. This challenge mandates U.S. Armed Forces reliance on joint operations. Joint operations in the future will be different from those in the past. In the past, the term "joint" often translated to multiple services working in isolation, but toward a common goal. The future will force the services to integrate their unique capabilities to leverage a combined effort.

U.S. Armed Forces are now in their tenth year of drawdown. Although the size of the force has decreased, particularly the permanent overseas presence, the importance of force projection is no less. Decreased overseas forces should be proportionally offset with an increased capability for force projection. The U.S. National Military Strategy of 1995 states that the combat forces and supporting communities are built on five fundamental foundations -- quality men and women, readiness, enhancements, modernization, and balance. Unfortunately, these do not address what may prove to be the most crucial pillar of all -- legitimate joint interoperability. This smaller force must be more than just "stronger and more versatile", it must leverage every joint advantage to succeed.<sup>6</sup>

Over the past five years, the U.S. Army has transitioned to a CONUS based force. CONUS basing adds a much more difficult element to force projection as compared to overseas basing. In the future, the U.S. Army will find itself deploying joint task forces

into regions with no lodgment previously established. Sufficient strategic lift is available to do this, if the flashpoint<sup>7</sup> scenario is patient enough to allow the movement timeline to play out. Force projection from CONUS means prioritization of lift becomes a critical decision (i.e. combat, combat support, or combat service support forces). The 1997 Strategic Assessment states that troubled states and transnational problems are the most likely scenarios the military will be tasked to respond in the next five to fifteen years. Such threats are more difficult to plan for since they are less structured and less predictable.<sup>8</sup> CNN's real time broadcasting of events as they unfold, will only increase the manifestation and consequences of early mistakes by U.S. forces. This will generate a dichotomy as to force flow prioritization -- force protection, infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, etc. The Armed Forces' ability to solve this puzzle will mark its success or failure over the next decades.

One potential solution may rest in better interoperability between CONUS based forces and forces that are forward-deployed. For example, the Navy/Marine Corps team maintains a forward-deployed presence throughout the world 365 days a year. This presence is found in the form of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) deployed in Navy amphibious shipping. *This monograph seeks to answer the question -- "What is the operational application for the forward-deployed MAGTF in a joint environment?"* The MAGTF could be the catalyst around which an Army or Air Force Joint Task Force Commander can build/leverage his capability, thereby simplifying initial Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) prioritization dilemma.



## **II. Navy/Marine Corps Team**

In 1995, the Department of the Navy produced an assessment called *Chaos in the Lattorals - Challenge and Opportunity*. As is expressed in the title, the lattorals are projected as the most likely location future conflict will occur. The lattorals are characterized by great cities, well populated coasts, and the intersection of sea and land trade routes. The lattorals represent less than 20% of the earth's surface, but account for 75% of the world's population, 80% of the world's capitals, and nearly all of the world's marketplaces for international trade

There has already been a quantum jump in lattoral conflict. In the last six years, the U.S. has deployed to contain conflict in Panama, Persian Gulf, Cuba/Caribbean, Kenya, Burundi, Zaire, Bangladesh, Philippines, Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, Bosnia, Algeria, and Taiwan -- all lattoral regions.<sup>9</sup> Each of these required armed intervention, show of force, and/or humanitarian assistance. In addition, both Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) are in the lattorals. There are no guarantees when it comes to predicting future conflict, but this assessment seems to make as much sense as any other.

The Navy/Marine Corps team is older than the United States. In 1775, the Continental Congress authorized the raising of one battalion of Marines to provide protection for shipping (sharp shooters and boarding parties). Soon after, the Continental Navy was officially established and sea-going Marines became a traditional footnote in American history. In 1798, congress elected to establish the Marine Corps as a military service separate from the Army and Navy.<sup>10</sup> Maybe the most significant was in the early 1900's when the United States adopted the Mahanian Theory of commerce -- control of

the seas is paramount to security, international trade, and national wealth for an island nation.<sup>11</sup> The combination of these factors thrust the Navy/Marine team into a vital role in the National Security Strategy.

Naval forces are one of the key assets used by the President to establish a forward, peacetime presence. This presence serves both to deter and to build interoperability -- the ability to operate in concert with friendly and allied forces. Participation with NATO standing forces, and in a variety of exercises around the globe with friends and allies, provides a solid foundation for sustaining interoperability.<sup>12</sup>

One major advantage unique to naval forces is the sovereignty of a U.S. warship. As long as the ship is in international waters, it and all embarked personnel are free of the political encumbrances that inhibit or limit land-based operations. This alone provides the theater commander with a variety of flexible deterrent options for a quick and appropriate response.<sup>13</sup> It also offers a fulcrum on which to leverage a JTF trying to establish a lodgment on a foreign shore. However, for this to work, the Army and Air Force must understand how and why the Navy/Marine team operates.

### **III. Operational Maneuver From the Sea**

Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines a naval campaign as "... an operation or a connected series of operations conducted essentially by naval forces including all surface, subsurface, air and amphibious troops, for the purpose of gaining, extending or maintaining control of the sea."<sup>14</sup> The Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) are the core of the navy's ability to project force. The ARG consists of amphibious shipping

along with the Navy commander and staff necessary to command and control an amphibious operation.<sup>15</sup> Formidability of the ARG is increased when augmented with other forward-deployed surface war ships. Cruisers and destroyers add naval gunfire support, standoff attack, precision strike, and anti-air/theater ballistic missile defense capabilities.<sup>16</sup> The combination of these air, land and sea capabilities make the naval expeditionary force a flexible and formidable option when looking to influence or deter an emerging crisis.

Marine responsibilities during a naval campaign have historically included:

- Defense of existing U.S. advanced bases.
- Seizure of areas for development of new advanced bases.
- Destruction/seizure of enemy advanced bases and support facilities.
- Occupation of areas that block passage of opposing naval forces.
- Land-based aviation support of fleet operations.
- Sea-based aviation support of naval operations.<sup>17</sup>

There are also a variety of additional missions that can be assigned to Marine forces in context of land operations. Although this is considered a collateral function, it is one of the specific areas a force afloat can assist a Joint Task Force (JTF) in the prosecution of its campaign:

- Strategic distraction, to force the opponent to disperse his defenses along vulnerable littorals.
- Raids, to destroy installations, units, or individuals that may have significant bearing on the campaign.
- Lodgment, to prepare for introduction of large-scale expeditionary forces.
- Extraction, to evacuate an expeditionary force under enemy pressure.
- Strategic reserve, to exploit opportunities and counter threats which develop during the course of the campaign.
- Reinforcement, to join the continental campaign alongside the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.<sup>18</sup>

The essence of Operational Maneuver from the Sea is the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level. Understanding naval force employment requires knowledge of the foundational construct upon which the Marine Corps fights. This philosophy of warfighting is called maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps' doctrine provides the authoritative basis for how the Marine Corps fights and prepares to fight. FMFM 1, *Warfighting* is the first of a series of foundational publications that depicts how Marines will wage war:

- War is founded on the laws of science, but ultimately demands the intuition and creativity of art.
- War is characterized by the interaction of both moral and physical forces.
- War is a clash between opposing human wills, as such, the human dimension is central in war.
- Friction is inherent to all conflict. Minimize it where you can, but more importantly, be prepared to fight effectively within the medium of friction.
- All actions in war take place in an atmosphere of uncertainty -- the fog of war.
- Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission. Part of risk is the ungovernable element of chance. Chance must be viewed not only as a threat, but also as an opportunity to be exploited.
- Fluidity is an integral attribute of the nature of war. No episode can be viewed in isolation. Each emerges with those that precede and follow it, creating a continuous, fluctuating fabric of activity replete with fleeting opportunities and unseen events.
- Suppressive effects of firepower are essential to our ability to maneuver. However, the greatest value of firepower is not physical destruction, whose cumulative effects are felt only slowly, but the moral dislocation it causes.<sup>19</sup>

Maneuver warfare is a doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver synchronized with aggressive combined arms. Traditional understanding of maneuver is spatial, but maneuver warfare considers time as well. In other words, generating a faster operational tempo than the enemy in order to gain a temporal advantage.<sup>20</sup> Maneuver warfare uses speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of

combat, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Through the use of greater tempo and velocity, maneuver warfare seeks to establish a pace the enemy cannot maintain. The intent is to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy must see his situation not only as deteriorating, but deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist.<sup>21</sup>

Operational maneuver has its roots in maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver designed to dominate tempo.<sup>22</sup> Likewise, operational maneuver is a bold bid for victory aimed at exploiting significant enemy weaknesses in order to deal a decisive blow. To be effective this must be more than mere operational level movement.<sup>23</sup> Specifically, Operational Maneuver from the Sea emphasizes six principles.

- Operational objective.
- The sea as maneuver space.
- Overwhelming tempo and momentum.
- Strength against weakness.
- Intelligence, deception, and flexibility.
- Integration of all organic, joint, and combined assets.<sup>24</sup>

The capture of Seoul in 1950 is a classic example of an operational maneuver from the sea. Forces flowed coherently from San Diego, Sasebo, and Pusan, through an amphibious power projection at Inchon. The objective was to attack a key North Korean critical vulnerability -- the main line of communication (LOC) running through the Han River valley. Tempo, operational objective, momentum, strength applied against weakness, and the sea as maneuver space were used to seize the initiative and place the

North Korean army on the horns of dilemma. The result was the decisive action of the Korean Conflict.<sup>25</sup> If the operation had been executed merely as an amphibious lodgment at Inchon, it would have generated only a local and operationally insignificant, tactical victory.

Maneuver warfare combines an understanding of the dynamic nature of conflict, the imperative of decisive objectives, and the requirement for quick decisions and high tempo operations. Naval warfare is founded on an appreciation for the strategic level of war, the advantages inherent in sea-borne movement, and the flexibility provided by sea-based logistics. Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare. When properly united, these elements provide the United States with a naval expeditionary force that is instantly ready to help any friend, defeat any foe, and convince potential enemies of the wisdom of keeping the peace.<sup>26</sup>

## **CHAPTER II**

### **MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF)**

#### **I. The MAGTF Concept**

On 7 December 1933, Navy Department Order 241 designated the operational air, ground, and support units in the Marine Corps as Fleet Marine Forces (FMF). The FMF marked the first attempt in history to create a major unified air-land-sea-logistics force. It continues to exist as a balanced force of combined arms comprising Marine land, air, and service elements. This balanced force achieves unity of effort through centralized direction, decentralized execution, and common doctrine; thus allowing the task organizing of assets to meet evolving international crisis through naval campaigns.<sup>27</sup> An integral part of a U.S. Fleet, the FMF has the status of a type command under the operational control of the Fleet Commander in Chief (CINC) and the command (less operational control) of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.<sup>28</sup> FMF commanders form MAGTFs to meet specific and recurring CINC needs. When afloat, the MAGTF is under the operational control of the designated Fleet Commander. Once established ashore, the MAGTF usually comes under the operational control of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or the Land Component Commander (LCC).

There are four sizes of MAGTFs. From largest to smallest they are:

- Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
- Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (MEF (FWD))
- Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
- Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF)

All four are common in that they include the same elements -- command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), air combat element (ACE), and combat service support element (CSSE).<sup>29</sup> The MEF and MEU are standing headquarters, so their organization is more predictable. The MEF(FWD) and the SPMAGTF are created as needed; conversely their organization is determined each time they are stood up.

MAGTFs are deployed by two mediums -- amphibious shipping and strategic air. If amphibious, the MAGTF will arrive on station self contained and fully prepared for combat. Table 1 depicts the command relationships for various forward-deployed Navy/Marine teams. If inserted by air, it will link up in theater with assets delivered by maritime prepositioned ships (MPS). The difference between the two is significant at the MEF(FWD) level. The fly-in MEF(FWD) has more combat power than the amphibious version. Appendix D displays a comparison of assets.

## **II. The MAGTF Elements**

The command element (CE) of the MAGTF includes both the commander and his staff, as well as, units providing unique capabilities that are controlled at the MAGTF level. The rank of the MAGTF commander will be at least one rank higher than the three component commanders who work for him (GCE, ACE, and CSSE). As such, a MEF is commanded by a Lieutenant General, a MEF (FWD) is usually commanded by a Brigadier General, a MEU is commanded by a Colonel, and a SPMGTF is commanded by an officer of rank commensurate with the forces assigned. The GCE, ACE, and CSSE commanders are co-equal and work directly for the MAGTF commander. See Table 1 for comparable command organizations.



The ground combat element (GCE) is task organized around combat and combat support units. It ranges in size and capability from a reinforced company to one or more reinforced divisions. GCEs normally include a mixture of infantry, supporting arms, mobility, reconnaissance, combat engineer, and armor type forces. The GCE is the cornerstone of the MAGTF's force projection capability. See Table 1 for comparable force organizations.

The air combat element (ACE) plans and executes air operations for the MAGTF. Marine aviation functions include air reconnaissance, antiair warfare, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE varies in size and capability from a reinforced helicopter squadron to one or more Marine Air Wings. The ACE is task organized with appropriate combat support units, and a mixture of helicopter and fixed wing assets commensurate with the missions assigned. See Table 1 for comparable force organizations.

The combat service support element (CSSE) is task organized to provide the necessary combat service support to accomplish the MAGTF mission. The CSSE provides combat service support to the CE, GCE, and ACE. All CSS functions are coordinated through the CSSE. Its size and capabilities vary from an expanded Force Service Support Group that supports a MEF to a smaller combat service support detachment that would support a SPMAGTF. Regardless of size, the CSSE usually includes transportation, medical, dental, heavy engineering, communications, maintenance, and other technical experts. See Table 1 for comparable force organizations.

<b>MAGTF</b>	<b>CMDR</b>	<b>GCE</b>	<b>ACE</b>	<b>CSSE</b>
MEF	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	REIN INF DIVISION +	WING	FSSG +
MEF (FWD)	COLONEL - BRIG GENERAL	REIN INF REGIMENT +	COMPOSITE GROUP	TBD
MEU	COLONEL	BATTALION LANDING TEAM (BLT)	COMPOSITE SQUADRON	MEU SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP
SPMAGTF	MAJOR - COLONEL	REIN COMPANY +	TBD	TBD

**Table 1 -- MAGTF Organization and Component Elements**

#### **IV. Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadrons**

Three MPS squadrons are prepositioned around the world to cover the Mediterranean, Indian, and Pacific regions. Squadrons consist of four to five civilian owned and operated, deep draft ships. Each squadron carries equipment for a MEF (FWD) (17,000 Marines) and 30 days sustainment. A sample of what a squadron would offer is:

- (36) 155mm howitzers
- (58) M1A1 tanks
- (109) assault amphibian vehicles
- (30) light armored vehicles
- (1 million) meals ready to eat (MRE)
- 82,000 gallons of water per ship
- Approximately 6 million gallons of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL)

MPS squadrons are capable of roll on/roll off pierside off load, or self-sustained instream (sea state 2 or less) discharge. If instream, causeways and lighterages are used. Bulk fuel and water can be discharged from up to two miles off shore.<sup>30</sup>

During Desert Shield, MPS assets were used to equip a fly-in MEF (FWD) of 17,000 Marines. The squadron arrived from its staging port in 7 days. Five days later the

off load was complete. Eighteen days after designation to deploy, the MEF (FWD) was operational with a mechanized heavy force and 30 days sustainment.<sup>31</sup>

MPS operations are not without cost. They require a secure area to unload, assemble, and marry the equipment with the designated force. Adequate airlift, aerial tanker support, and 747/C-5/C141 capable airfields are required to bring in the force. Ample beach and/or deep water port facilities are required for instream or pierside off loads. Finally, suitable roads and staging areas are needed to move the equipment from the beach/port to a location it can be staged and then received by the incoming force. Obviously, beach, port, and staging areas require security to protect against theft and sabotage.

#### **IV. The MAGTF -- A Contingency Option**

Key terms to remember when working with a MAGTF are task organized, expeditionary, and combined arms capable. As such, no two MAGTFs are organized exactly alike. All are task organized based on the mission, environment, and desires of the supported CINC.

The two MAGTFs most frequently deployed are the MEU and the SPMAGTF. Both provide the CINC a sustainable, flexible, responsive, expandable, and credible capability in a forward-deployed status. If the MEU or SPMAGTF is not large enough, it can be expanded. There is also sufficient flexibility to tailor the force packaging based the specifics of the mission. Naval shipping also provides a U.S. territorial platform allowing the inherent advantage of remaining on station for duration of the crisis. Regardless of the

size MAGTF, its task organization, sea basing, and loitering capability make it a valuable asset in the execution of the National Security Strategy.

Future flashpoints will unfold quickly, and be marked by the need for rapid deployment followed by prudent employment of the force. This is sure to increase the potential of MAGTFs being employed in support of JTFs. The most likely MAGTF to fill this role is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Therefore, the remainder of this monograph focuses on the MEU and its application to the joint arena.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE)**

#### **I. Introduction**

MEU(SOC) provides the CINC an immediate and effective means of dealing with regional uncertainty and threats. Deployed aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) shipping, these units provide deterrence and enhanced crisis response through forward-deployed presence. It is important to understand that the title special operations capable does not mean special operations forces, but a capability to perform certain missions in rapid response situations.

There are seven standing MEU headquarters that deploy on a rotating basis (see Table 2), at least two of which are forward-deployed 365 days a year. Each MEU joins its respective subordinate units (GCE, ACE, and MSSG) and begins training with the ARG/PHIBRON<sup>32</sup> at D-180.<sup>33</sup> Six months of staff integration (Navy/Marine) significantly enhances the ARG/MEU's operational agility.

The MEU's six month work-up (Predeployment Training Program -- PTP) includes an 18 week training cycle, a three week evaluation/certification process, and a three week embarkation/pre-deployment coordination period. Every day of the training cycle is necessary to achieve the MEU(SOC) standard. This also provides the opportunity to enhance interoperability with the supporting CVBG, likely Joint Task Forces the MEU could support, designated Air Force units, CINCs, and civilian agencies.<sup>34</sup> Next, the MEU must pass a rigid evaluation/certification process prior to being designated as special

operations capable. Finally, key personnel from the MEU spend a week in Washington DC and Ft Bragg receiving briefs and conducting coordination with various agencies, departments, and task forces. The end result is a highly skilled, integrated team ready to respond to CINC needs abroad.

MEU	HOME-BASE	DEPLOYMENT COVERAGE
22ND MEU	EAST COAST	ATLANTIC, CARIBBEAN, MEDITERRANEAN
24TH MEU	EAST COAST	ATLANTIC, CARIBBEAN, MEDITERRANEAN
26TH MEU	EAST COAST	ATLANTIC, CARIBBEAN, MEDITERRANEAN
11TH MEU	WEST COAST	PACIFIC, INDIAN, PERSIAN
13TH MEU	WEST COAST	PACIFIC, INDIAN, PERSIAN
15TH MEU	WEST COAST	PACIFIC, INDIAN, PERSIAN
31ST MEU	OKINAWA	PACIFIC, INDIAN, PERSIAN

**Table 2 -- Specific MEU Home-Base and Standard Deployment Coverage<sup>35</sup>**


Built in sustainment is one of the more important capabilities of the MAGTF. Every MEU deploys with 15 days of accompanying supplies. If this is not sufficient, forward deployed maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS) are capable of reinforcing.<sup>36</sup> Each MPS designates two ships to be configured with stand-alone capabilities to support MEUs for operations in excess of 15 days.<sup>37</sup> The addition of a single maritime prepositioning ship to a forward-deployed MEU(SOC) adds 30 days sustainment, and the ability to expand the force.

## **II. MEU Organization**

MEU size and organization can be adjusted based on the needs of the CINCs. However, since the seven standing MEUs deploy primarily as forces in readiness, their organization is probably more constant than other MAGTFs. In 1997, the basic MEU is approximately 2200 members and deploys on a three ship mix, usually consisting of one

large helicopter deck ship and two smaller amphibious ships<sup>38</sup>. ARGs are built around the large deck helicopter ship, usually a Landing Helicopter Assault, LHA-1 Tarawa Class or the Landing Helicopter Dock, LHD-1 Wasp Class. The middle-sized ship in the ARG is the Amphibious Transport Dock, LPD-4 Class or LPD-17 Class. The smallest ship is the Landing Ship Dock, LSD-41 Class or LSD-49 Class.<sup>39</sup> See Appendix E for additional ship information.

Three major subordinate elements (MSE) of the MEU are a reinforced infantry battalion called a battalion landing team (BLT), a composite helicopter squadron, and a MEU service support group (MSSG) (see Figure 1).<sup>40</sup>



**Figure 1 -- MEU Organization**

The command element provides the staff necessary to command and control the MEU. In addition, there are several external units that are attached to the CE. Their employment is retained at the MEU level due to the sensitivity or uniqueness of their capabilities. These units include:

- Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Detachment -- ANGLICO enables the MEU to cross-attach forward air control, artillery forward observer, and naval gunfire observer capabilities to Allied or U.S. Army forces during joint or combined operations.<sup>41</sup>

- Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF)-- MSPF is the MEU unit with the most legitimate special operations capability. It conducts pre-assault and post-assault amphibious reconnaissance, long range tactical reconnaissance, and direct action. Combat capabilities include information gathering on area assessment, target acquisition, hydrographic survey, post-strike damage assessment, initial terminal guidance, limited scale raids, target/capture of selected enemy personnel, assault of maritime platforms, target interdiction, recovery operations, terminal guidance of improved munitions, and in-extremis hostage rescue.<sup>42</sup>
- Radio Battalion (RadBn) Detachment -- RadBn provides tactical signals intelligence and electronic warfare support to the MEU. Specific combat capabilities include ground-based and airborne tactical intercept, direction finding, electronic attack and command and control warfare, indicator and warning reporting, and signals intelligence analysis and reporting. It's radio reconnaissance teams are used with force reconnaissance to augment deep intelligence gathering.<sup>43</sup>
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Detachment -- UAV is a remote aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, battle damage assessment, and airborne radio relay platform called Predator.<sup>44</sup> It has electronic, infra red, and thermal capabilities.
- Intelligence Detachment (Intel Det)-- Intel Det offers a wide range of intelligence gathering augmentation to the MEU, including an interrogation



translator team (ITT), a counter-intelligence team (CIT), a topographical platoon (TOPO) detachment, a sensor control and management platoon (SCAMP) detachment, and a force imagery interpretation unit (FIU) detachment.<sup>45</sup>

The MEU CE is also augmented with requisite satellite and digital communication capabilities, and on an as needed basis, additional equipment and personnel to function as a JFC for limited periods of time.<sup>46</sup>

The Ground Combat Element represents a large part of the MEU's combat capability. It is built around an infantry battalion that has been reinforced with artillery, light armored vehicles, assault amphibious vehicles, ground reconnaissance, anti-armor, combat engineers, and tanks (see organization chart in Appendix A). This reinforced battalion is called a battalion landing team (BLT). It provides the forced entry capability for the MEU.

The Air Combat Element is a reinforced medium helicopter squadron (approximately 24 helicopters and 6 Harrier jets) tasked with conducting air operations and air support for the MEU. It also provides an airfield command and control capability, light anti-air defense (stinger), and a complete aircraft maintenance capability.

The MEU Service Support Group is the logistical and maintenance backbone of the MEU. Its basic functions are supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, health services, and services. Specifically, this includes disbursing, contracting, fuel storage and handling, embarkation, postal, dental, hospitalization, explosive ordnance disposal,

material handling, exchange, legal, civil affairs, ammunition handling and storage, graves registration, landing support (beach and airfield preparation), and evacuation control processing during a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). The collective assets of the CE, GCE, ACE, and MSSG combine to form the special operations capability of MEU(SOC).

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **MEU(SOC) CAPABILITIES**

#### **I. Missions and Special Skills**

In 1985 the Marine Corps began its MEU(SOC) program. This initiative was in response to a 1983 directive by Secretary of Defense Casper M. Weinberger. Through his directive, Mr Weinberger sought to achieve a level of expertise he saw as necessary to combat conflict in the future. The result for the Marine Corps was a new training orientation to support twenty-one special operations missions (see Appendix C). Thus the birth of the fourteen mission profiles (Table 3) that are evaluated during the rigorous special operations capable exercise (SOCEX). The requirement is to launch each of these operations within a six hour window of receipt of the warning order. The specific operations that are evaluated are:

- Amphibious Raid (boat, helicopter, and mechanized).
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (single and multiple-site).
- Security Operations (area and physical security to Embassy/Consulate facilities).
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Pilot (TRAP)
- Direct Action Mission
- Humanitarian/Civic Assistance
- Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2)
- Clandestine Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)
- Long Range raid (requiring forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations)
- Mass Casualty
- Airfield Seizure
- In-Extremis Hostage Rescue (IHR)
- \*Gas and Oil Platform (GOPLAT)
- \*Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)<sup>47</sup>

\* GOPLAT and MOI are evaluated prior to the SOCEX.

MISSION PROFILES	CE	GCE	ACE	MSSG
Amphib Raid		*raid force/ transportation	transportation/air cover	
NEO		*security/snipers	transportation/ air cover	evac control center (ECC)
Security	Fwd Cmd Element	*security		
TRAP		*TRAP force	transportation	
Direct Action	*assault force	security/R&S/ snipers	transportation	
Human/Civic Asst	yes	*yes		yes
R2P2	yes	yes	yes	yes
Clandestine R&S	R&S force	*R&S/insert means	insert means	
Long Range Raid		*raid force	FARP	
Mass Casualty		*security	transportation	medical teams
Airfield Seizure		*assault force	transportation	
GOPLAT	*assault force	security/snipers	transportation/ air cover	
MIO	*assault force	security/snipers	transportation/ air cover	
IHR	*assault force	security/R&S/ snipers	transportation/ air cover	

\*Denotes Mission Commander

**Table 3 -- Operation Delineation/Projected Mission Commander<sup>48</sup>**

The nature of these missions require special skills that an ordinary Marine unit does not train to. These special skills require additional schooling and special training.

The following is a list of the special skills that a MEU acquires:

- Scout swimmer
- Applied explosives and/or breacher
- Urban reconnaissance and surveillance
- Urban sniper
- Assault climber
- Coxswain and advanced coxswain
- Outboard motor maintenance
- Boat repair (rubber and fiberglass)
- Summer and Winter mountain leader
- HAZMAT officer and handler
- Motorcycle operator and maintenance
- Close Quarters Battle and security/trailer element

- Helicopter Rope Suspension Training (HRST) and Helicopter Insertion and Extraction
- Long range (over the horizon) maritime navigation
- Fire support coordination with Marine, Navy, and Air Force assets
- Interoperability and parallel training with PHIBRON NavSpecWar Det
- Advance load planning for air movement<sup>49</sup>

In order to achieve a level of proficiency in each of these missions/skills, the MEU designates specific units to be responsible for each. Due to the nature of the skills required, most fall to the BLT. Table 3 depicts the different missions assigned to each of the MEU's subordinate elements and which element is most likely to function as mission commander for that particular operation. There is also a need to align each mission with capability if it is to be of practical use. Communication assets will not be addressed since HF, UHF, VHF, and SATCOM are available for all MEU missions. The following paragraphs depict how past MEUs have approached these missions.<sup>50</sup>

**Amphibious raid** -- Each rifle company is designated to act as separate raid forces using AAV (mechanization), helicopters, or boat (combat rigid raider craft)<sup>51</sup> insert/extract platforms. In addition to over-the-horizon navigation skills, the boat company is also trained in cliff assault. Most MEUs create a fourth raid capability by combining LAVs with HUMMV mounted heavy machinegun and TOW assets. This unit is often pre-boated on LCACs to maximize rapid projection of force ashore. Demolition teams and combat photography ensure destruction is effective and verifiable.

One of the main reasons raid packages are successful is reconnaissance of the target area. The BLT has a platoon of division-level reconnaissance plus the infantry battalion's organic scout/sniper platoon. The MEU CE has a platoon of force

reconnaissance (deep reconnaissance insertable by submarine, high altitude low opening or high altitude high opening parachute). The PHIBRON has a platoon of SEALs.

**Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)** -- NEO is a legitimate all-MEU mission. Prior to a NEO, the MEU's forward command element travels to the embassy or U.S. Liaison Office to conduct liaison and gather planning factors. Security is provided by the BLT, though MSSG military police may assist. MSSG has two evacuation control center (ECC) teams to process evacuees. Both teams are capable of conducting independent ECCs at separate sites. Generic planning factors are 50 evacuees processed per hour per ECC team.<sup>52</sup> Each rifle company is also trained to conduct a hasty NEO with detailed processing to be accomplished on the ship. This is the least preferred technique, but useful when time is short because the threat is high.

Physical evacuation to ships is accomplished by helicopter and/or surface craft. The ARG has the capability of housing 1000+ evacuees by turning the well decks/hanger decks into cot billeting areas.<sup>53</sup>

Explosive, ordnance and disposal (EOD) personnel from the MSSG and/or ARG handle suspected improvised explosive devices (IED). This includes the ability to x-ray packages, defuse or interrupt IEDs in place, or remove IEDs from the premise and dispose of them in a bomb pit.

**Security** -- Security missions include protection of embassies, U.S. citizens and assets, international relief organizations, airfields, ports, convoys, etc. AAVs, LAVs, armored HUMMVs with machineguns, five-ton trucks with .50 caliber ring mounts, and transport and attack helicopters provide the MEU with a wide range of capability.

Successful security operations depend on effective intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts. The MEU has a small but capable counter-intelligence capability. The ARG also has a resident naval investigative service agent who interfaces with other civilian investigative/intelligence agencies already in country.

**Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Pilots (TRAP)** -- TRAP is just what it says, recovery of downed pilots and, when necessary, the recovery of their aircraft.<sup>54</sup> The TRAP unit has a variety of special skills and equipment to assist in retrieving an injured pilot in all terrain (trees, cliffs, mountains, etc.). The CH-53 heavy lift helicopter and tank retriever are the primary mechanical retrieve assets. Range is the primary limiting factor for the MEU TRAP capability. Without land basing or FARP support, 200 miles inland is maximum range a helicopterborne team can go and still have fuel to support the search/pick-up.

**Direct Action** -- Direct action is a small, highly skilled, destruction or recovery raid; with emphasis on discriminating lethality. The PHIBRON's SEAL platoon and the MEU's maritime special purpose force (MSPF)<sup>55</sup> have direct action capabilities.

**Humanitarian/Civil Assistance** -- Much of the MEUs humanitarian and civil assistance equipment and technical skills are resident in the MSSG. The manpower pool comes from the BLT. The combined efforts of the ARG and MEU enable substantial manpower, religious, engineer, medical, communication, and sustenance abilities. This is a mission that is executed in virtually every port the ARG enters. Local assistance to orphanages, churches, villages, and militaries are common during deployments. There is a

constant showing of good will and ambassadorship that facilitates the CINCs efforts to remain positively engaged .

**Clandestine Reconnaissance and Surveillance** -- SEALs, force reconnaissance, counter-intelligence, and MSPF reconnaissance units have this capability.

**Long-Range Raid** -- CH-53 helicopters are most frequently used for long range insertion; but C-130, LCAC, and boat are possibilities. The requirement is for the MEU to establish a FARP site to service a company-sized helicopter raid during ingress and egress.

**Mass Casualty** -- Mass casualty is a combination of security, litter bearers, and medical triage teams. Any accident/catastrophe producing over 5 casualties is considered a mass casualty scenario.

**Airfield Seizure** -- Airfield seizure includes the physical seizure of the facility and the ability to return it to operative form. The helicopterborne rifle company has this mission. Modified M151 jeeps (capable of internal CH-53 lift) with heavy machineguns and TOWS provide the firepower to conduct this mission. Once secure, the ACE provides the air traffic control and ground control teams to operate the control tower and runways, and the MSSG provides the material handling personnel and equipment (forklifts, etc.) to process the incoming/outgoing traffic.

**Gas and Oil Platform (GOPLAT)** -- GOPLAT is the seizure and partial destruction of gas and oil platforms. Recent years have seen these platforms used to house anti-air and anti-ship missiles.<sup>56</sup> SEALs and MSPF train to conduct this mission.



Both surface<sup>57</sup> and helicopter means of insertion are available. Destruction of a GOPLAT is no small task; usually meaning "out of action for a specific period of time".

**Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)** -- MIO is the underway boarding and seizure of ships on the high seas. This may be conducted by surface or helicopter means. The initial task is to stop the ship, then search it. As such, boarding teams go to the bridge and engine room first. This capability is especially useful when supporting an embargo. If conducted as part of an in-extremis hostage rescue; tactics would be altered.

**In-Extremis Hostage Rescue (IHR)** -- In-extremis is the operative word. This is not an attempt to compete with national hostage rescue assets. However, the 1986 seizure of the Achille Lauro<sup>58</sup> underscored a need for forward-deployed MAGTFs to give CINCs an emergency response capability until national assets can arrive. Although not officially titled as such, tier three is a good capability comparison. The MSPF conducts this mission.

Regardless of the mission profile, all MEU operations have one thing in common -- they are planned by using the rapid response planning process. Planning and executing a mission within six hours is a cornerstone of MEU credibility.

## **2. Rapid Response Planning**

Every MEU operation employs rapid response planning. This is the heart of the MEU's capability and value to the CINC/JFC. Rapid response planning is the combination of a condensed version of deliberate planning (combining several steps into one) and personal integration of the commander into the entire planning process. The requirement is to conduct the entire planning, briefing, rehearsal, and launch process in six

hours. One of the ways this differs from deliberate planning is the commander's involvement. A six hour constraint precludes the ability to brief the commander separately. Commanders must be part of the process throughout, from mission analysis through detailed planning.

Upon receipt of mission, the MEU and PHIBRON commanders convene the crisis action team (CAT). The CAT consists of key MEU and PHIBRON staff officers, GCE commander and S-3, ACE commander and S-3, and MSSG commander if he is aboard the command ship. Over the first four hours the PHIBRON and MEU plan the details of the mission. The remaining two hours are for the units commanders to brief teams and rehearse. The requirement is for the force to physically launch prior to the six hour mark. The following is an example of the six hour timeline.

00:00	Mission/warning order message is received. MEU S-2 and S-3 begin mission and enemy situation analysis.
00:10-00:30	CAT is convened for mission analysis, enemy situation brief, identification of constraints/restraints, review of naval considerations (sailing time, underway replenishment, etc.), draft and send warning order to other ships, identify CCIR, designation of mission commander, issuance of MEU commander's guidance and establishment of a timeline for planning.
00:30-1:00	Mission commander, raid/task force commander, BLT S-3, BLT S-2, and ACE commander develop courses of action (to include R&S plan).
1:00-1:30	Mission commander briefs courses of action to CAT and solicits staff estimates. MEU commander selects course of action. Emergency assault plan is identified (if applicable).
1:30-3:00	BLT, MEU, ACE, MSSG, and PHIBRON/ship staffs develop the detailed plan. Concurrent with detailed planning, designated forces are briefed on known enemy situation; draw ammunition, water, chow, batteries, litters, etc.; stage equipment and weapons; review tactics, techniques, and procedures; and prepare manifests.

- 3:00-4:00 Confirmation Brief is conducted. The confirmation brief is a short, sweet, to the point brief back, with every leader (ground, air, ship, support, staff) articulating exactly how he will accomplish his portion of the mission. It offers a final opportunity for questions to facilitate shared vision, and validate the feasibility and synchronization of the plan.
- 4:00-6:00 The remaining two hours are for unit commanders to brief mission forces, conduct final rehearsals, test fire weapons, and stage for launch.<sup>59</sup>

Most new comers to the MEU(SOC) arena view this timeline with great skepticism -- too ambitious. In fact, they would be correct were it not for the 21 MEU(SOC) missions. Designated mission profiles enable the MEU to develop what is called a playbook. The playbook details force size and corresponding logistic requirements for each mission option. Enemy situation and terrain dictate how much you deviate from the playbook. Months of practice are required to work out the specifics of such a playbook; but in the end, the tactics, techniques, and procedures for each of the 21 missions have been developed in detail. This includes palletizing standard logistics and support packages for each mission profile so they can be quickly moved for the storage spaces below deck to the hanger/well deck where units conduct final preparations.

Every MEU must demonstrate its ability to accomplish this planning timeline under constrained circumstances. As such, at the completion of the pre-deployment training package, the MEU embarks aboard the ARG and spends seven to ten days responding to different missions (some simultaneous) against aggressor forces. This formal evaluation is called the special operations capable exercise (SOCEX) and is what determines whether the MEU is worthy of the (SOC) designation. Key to passing the SOCEX is effective rapid planning. Failure to launch within the six hour window is mission failure. Failure to

achieve mission success in spite of weather conditions and a live aggressor force is mission failure. Plans must not only be quickly developed, but must be feasible, synchronized, rehearsed, and successful.

There is a dual advantage to the rapid response planning process. Not only is it essential to meeting the six hour window for the 21 missions, but it also allows the MEU to conduct non-playbook mission planning in substantially reduced time. This is what has earned the MEU(SOC) the reputation and title as a "CINC 911".<sup>60</sup>

In February 1995, 22nd MEU was steaming off the coast of southern Italy. At 2000, the MEU Commander received a transmission from Admiral Snuffy Smith<sup>61</sup> (Commander Strike Force South) directing planning<sup>62</sup> be initiated to extract the Bangladesh battalion that was cut off by Serbia forces in the Bihac pocket.<sup>63</sup> Smith's directive required three courses of action. Each option was to include time/distance and movement factors, helicopter team designations, fuel and logistics considerations, and time phasing. The plan was due to STRIKESOUTH by 0700 the next morning and had to be executable within 24 hours. At 2030 the MEU and PHIBRON commanders convened a crisis action team (CAT) meeting and the BLT commander was designated the mission commander for planning. The BLT, ACE, and MSSG staffs worked through the night developing courses of action. Multiple satellite calls were made to forces in Italy, Bosnia, and Germany in order to determine specific planning and time/distance factors. Those that could not be extracted by phone call were developed by the MEU's intelligence detachment using various map scanning devices or stubby pencil work. At 0530 the MEU commander was briefed on the three options, and at 0630 the courses of action with

estimates and recommendations were forwarded to Admiral Smith. During the night, the PHIBRON had closed to within striking distance of the Croatian coastline, and was in position to execute any of the three plans by sunrise the following morning. Three MEU rotations later, two of these plans were still being used as primary and alternate evacuation contingencies. The key to the MEU's ability to meet Admiral Smith's timeline was rapid planning.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **JOINT OPERATIONS APPLICABILITY**

#### **1. A Joint Multiplier**

The Navy/Marine Team provides sea-based forces that are relative across the entire continuum of joint operations.<sup>64</sup> This does not insinuate the Navy/Marine Team is self sufficient, nor that it does not need to operate jointly. The nature of future conflict, coupled with the expectations of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987, demands an expectation that future operations will be joint and/or combined.

MEUs have the ability to respond quickly, to fight and win if deterrence fails, or to support/enable other U.S. forces entering the theater. The added ability to operate without land basing is a tremendous political and military advantage. "Storing" the force on the high seas until needed offers a high degree of sensitivity as to when, where, and what force will be employed, if any at all.

When a crisis arises, the first two questions usually asked by CINC and national decision-makers are -- "Where is the CVBG?" and "Where is the ARG/MEU?" As a result of their forward deployed status, the CVBG and MEU are most often the initial force called on to respond to emerging crises. Both are traditionally engaged during the transition from crisis to conflict, and later to ensure compliance with the terms of peace.

MEUs are deployed on a scheduled, continuous, world-wide, recurring basis. What happens when CINCs have conflicting needs that can not be met by existing MEU schedules? There are three methods of solving this dilemma. If the crisis occurs within 45

days of a MEU's return to CONUS, the MEU can be turned around and re-deployed. For this reason, all MEUs are placed in a 45 day, post-deployment, contingency status before releasing their subordinate units back to parent commands. Another option is to early deploy a MEU prior to completion of its predeployment training program. Due to the rigors of this program and the desired special operations capable certification, this option is not preferred (though it has been used).<sup>65</sup> If this option is selected, a SOCEX type evaluation would probably be administered enroute. Rather than accelerate the MEU cycle, the Marine Corps prefers to source uncovered CINC needs through SPMAGTFs<sup>66</sup>. SPMAGTFs are packaged for specific missions and usually for a limited period of time. Regardless, all three options provide the same a forward-deployed, sea based, combined arms advantage.

If the forward-deployed MAGTF is to continue its usefulness, there must be a joint benefit. Eight unique advantages the ARG/MEU offers a CINC are:

- The ARG/MEU is self contained.
- The ARG/MEU is self sustaining.
- The ARG/MEU can loiter in the vicinity of a pending crisis.
- The ARG/MEU brings its own air support.
- The ARG/MEU has no self limiting reliance on facilities (airfield, port, etc.).
- The ARG/MEU is mobile and can concentrate where needed.
- The ARG/MEU has a forced entry capability.
- The ARG/MEU has a self withdrawal capability.<sup>67</sup>

Collectively, these represent a joint multiplier the MEU offers a CINC or JFC.

Specifically, there are seven operational profiles the MEU could readily assist a JTF in -- combat, humanitarian assistance, security, noncombatant evacuation, recovery operations,

lodgment, military to military assistance/combined exercises, and a flexible deterrent option.<sup>68</sup>

## **2. Combat Operations**

The two most important things the Marine Corps does for the nation are to make Marines and to win battles.<sup>69</sup> Although the MEU is trained to deal with crises short of war, the core of its capability is combat related. The ability to project combat forces on a hostile shore has always been fundamental to the Navy/Marine Team. Combat operations and amphibious assault are the MEU's top mission priorities.

Naval forces are forward-deployed to protect U.S. national interests. Forces deployed for routine exercises and posturing are also the forces most likely to be called on to respond quickly to an emerging crisis. These forces have been organized, trained, and equipped to meet a variety of crises, the chief of which is war. This provides the CINC or JFC with a credible crisis-response capability in the event deterrence fails.<sup>70</sup>

CINCs and JFCs should not hesitate to land Marines for combat operations. With the sea as maneuver space and MEU/CVBG air in support, the MEU can insert a robust reinforced infantry battalion or numerous fire support control nodes into the hostile region. Either option creates substantial difficulty for the enemy.

If landing the BLT is the preferred option, there are multiple missions that can be performed. The MEU can conduct destruction raids, MOUT operations, limited objective attacks, and reinforcement operations; or it can be a very effective deception. Airfield or port seizure to facilitate follow-on forces being introduced into theater is another good use



of the MEU. The MEU has sufficient combat punch to cause most flashpoint threats to think twice before acting aggressively. See Table 4.

<b>GCE</b>	<b>ACE</b>
(4) M1 Tanks	(4) CH-53 Heavy Lift Helo
(12) Assault Amphib Vehicle (AAV)	(12) CH-46 Med Lift Helo
(8-24) Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)	(4) AH-1 Cobra Atk Helo
(6) 155mm towed howitzers	(4) UH-1 Huey C2 Helo
(8) 81mm mortars	(6) AV-8 Harrier Jet
(12) 60mm mortars	(2) KC-130 Jet
(26) MK19 40mm Grenade Launchers	
(8-16) TOW launchers	
(24) Dragon Launchers	
(20) .50 cal Machineguns	
(50) M-60 Machineguns	
(5) Stinger Missile Teams	
(3) Rifle Co (140 Marines each)	

**Table 4 -- MEU Combat Capabilities**

The MEU's best combat capability may well be its threat of combat capability. Normal steaming speed for an amphibious ship is 17-20 knots. At 17 knots per hour, a ship can move 200 miles in ten hours. For example, even if he knows the ARG's exact location at sundown and knows the ARG will land somewhere prior to dawn, the enemy must still protect 400 miles of coast line.<sup>71</sup> Over-the-horizon positioning of the ship and the ARG's ability to paint size/location deception offer an additional twist to the JFC's combat power leverage.

Recent examples of the MEU being used to support a joint force in combat operations include the invasion of Grenada, Desert Storm, JTF Somalia, and the withdrawal under pressure of the UN forces from Somalia. During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, ARG/MEU assets were the first to arrive in Somalia. Marines serving as

the lead element of the JTF, seized the airfield and port facility in Mogadishu, thereby facilitating the introduction of follow-on Marine and Army forces.<sup>72</sup> Forward-deployed Marines, provide combat capability with a range of deployment options.

### **3. Humanitarian Assistance**

Sea-based support to a country devastated by natural disaster, famine, or dislocation is another value of the MEU. The ARG/MEU can provide communications, transportation, technical repair advice, food, water, and shelter. For example, MEU equipment that would be helpful in an humanitarian assistance operation include:

- two water purification reverse osmosis units
- over forty 5-ton trucks
- two complete field kitchens
- 18 CP tents and 26 GP tents
- wreckers
- floodlights
- forklifts
- engineer equipment (dozers, front end loaders, backhoes)
- generators
- medical and dental capabilities
- ambulances
- mine detection and clearing equipment
- three amphibious ships with fresh water making capabilities, food, shelter, hospitalization, etc.<sup>73</sup>

In 1991 the 24th MEU was tasked by CINCEUR to support the Kurdish refugee relief effort in northern Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort). This operation was unique in that it required the MEU to go several hundred miles inland, where ARG shipping could not support.<sup>74</sup> Other examples of the MEU being used to support humanitarian operations include: Restore Hope in Somalia (1993), Continued Hope in Somalia (1994), Support Hope in Rwanda (1994), Support Democracy and Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994), and

Assured Response in Liberia (1996).<sup>75</sup> While all DOD forces are capable of conducting humanitarian relief (Los Angeles, Dade County Florida, etc.), the ARG/MEU's autonomy, independence, and sea basing give it dimensions that can provide a unique political and military advantage to the JFC.

#### **4. Security Operations**

Security operations and combat operations require similar forces, but substantially different mindsets. Combat rules of engagement are radically different from the peacetime rules of engagement a unit might be asked to use during a security operation. The MEU is well suited to make this transition. At least half of the MEU's special operations capable exercise (SOCEX) is focused on the individual Marine's ability to differentiate between the need to apply force and the need for restraint. SOCEX chronology of events fluctuate between peacetime and combat missions (i.e. amphibious destruction raid, artillery raid, mass casualty, direct action, permissive NEO that turns non permissive mid-mission, TRAP, etc.). Each "peacetime ROE" event is sure to have armed, potentially threatening locals in the area. Sometimes aggressor rogue actions are intended to be menacing and sometimes they are not. Marines must make split second decisions on shoot/do not shoot situations. The wrong decision by one Marine jeopardizes (SOC) certification for the entire MEU.

Every Marine is first and foremost a rifleman. No unit in the MEU has the luxury of shying away from security missions. For example, in 1994, BLT 1/6 (22nd MEU) designated the artillery battery as the mass casualty force.<sup>76</sup> The 81mm mortar platoon was designated as the primary TRAP force. A task force of LAVs and mounted heavy

machineguns/TOWS was a back-up raid force, security for the NEO, and back-up TRAP force. MSSG personnel frequently served as perimeter security during NEOs and embassy reinforcements. Although the MEU does not like to conduct split-ARG operations,<sup>77</sup> each ship is indeed capable of conducting limited, but separate missions. Security is one of the missions each ship would be able to provide.

On several occasions the MEU has been tasked to secure an area for MPS off load.<sup>78</sup> Criminal/theft threat is usually the main concern. MEUs can secure ports and airfields (Somalia 1992), provide convoy escort (Somalia, Liberia, Haiti), guard relief workers (Somalia, Haiti, northern Iraq), and cordon off sites during earthquakes and floods (Philippines, Bangladesh, Puerto Rico).<sup>79</sup> Security is a viable mission for the MEU, and the MEU is trained and equipped to accomplish this mission under combat or peacetime rules of engagement.

## **5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)**

MEU is the force of choice for NEOs. The execution of a NEO sends a significant, negative signal to the host nation; one that most Ambassadors are reluctant to issue until all options are expended. This creates a difficult scenario for most NEO forces. It requires the patience and loitering ability to turn it on, turn it off, and then turn it on again. By nature, NEOs are slow to develop. However, once the decision is made to initiate a NEO, immediate results are expected by the NCA, supported Ambassador, and evacuees. NEO is a distinct possibility for any flashpoint deployment.<sup>80</sup> A JFC trying to establish lodgment in a deteriorating situation does not need to be burdened with balancing which forces to deploy/employ first -- NEO or combat.

## **6. Recovery Operations**

Every CINC wants a recovery capability in theater. Likewise, every JFC wants to know he can respond quickly and decisively to a hostage type situation without going through all the red tape involved with asking to use someone else's asset. The MEU provides the JFC a recovery capability that is responsive, credible, and self contained. JTF commanders and planners should request a demonstration of this capability before deciding against it.

## **7. Lodgment**

Lodgment is the JTF's most vulnerable phase, when it has the least amount of capability or flexibility. As such, this may be the phase when the MEU has the most to provide a JFC. Not only can it offer the mission profiles listed above, but it has a variety of obscure capabilities to contribute as well: disbursing, exchange, legal, hazardous material handling, contracting, medical, dental, religious, welding, maintenance, airfield control, material handling and equipment, traffic control, POL, sustainment, etc. In addition, the MEU is fully capable of acting as the forward command until the JFC can arrive. During Assured Response in Liberia and Central African Republic (1996)<sup>81</sup>, the MEU commander was the JFC. Failure to utilize the forward deployed MAGTF here would be very poor economy of management.

## **8. Military-to-Military/Combined Exercises**

Engagement and enlargement necessitate an active role in both of these areas. Over committed is the common phrase heard throughout deployed Department of Defense

forces. The MEU has three ships that may be able to alleviate some of this requirement. Both of these roles are a normal part of every MEU deployment. Combined exercises would be harder to add once deployed, but there are many military-to-military opportunities that the ARG/MEU could help out with.

U.S. naval vessels have a long history of impressing foreign dignitaries. A major part of what the Navy does well is show the flag. In a third world region, the ship may be the only place for the JFC to entertain local officials in impressive style. Just remember, the captain of that naval vessel is king. Requests for support will go much further than demands.

## **9. Flexible Deterrent Option**

Every leader searches for ways to defuse flashpoints without escalation. Flexible deterrent options are a viable way to discourage without directly applying force. If the crisis region is inland, the MEU may be of little help. However, history says the flashpoint will probably be in the littorals. For the reasons already discussed in this monograph, the ARG/MEU is a credible course of action. It offers show of force, punitive strike, raid, and forced entry as initial options, and it can increase the deterrence as needed. As stated earlier, "Where is the ARG/MEU?" is one of the first questions the NCA asks during time of crisis. This alone offers enormous credibility to the message being sent. When it comes to deterrent options, credibility may be the difference between success and failure.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

Flexible responses to flashpoints dealing with troubled states and transnational problems are the primary missions the U.S. Army will be asked to accomplish during the next decade. Engagement and enlargement means continued increased operational tempo. The combination of these two factors will make it more and more difficult for the Army to “go it alone”.

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* says “the nature of modern warfare ***demands*** (authors emphasis) that we fight as a team...” Joint operations has been a buzz word for fifteen years, yet Army planners still view the forward-deployed MAGTF as insignificant; of little or no value. Ask an Army planner how he intends to utilize the MEU to leverage his advantage and you will most likely get a puzzled look. Even in the Army’s elite School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), knowledge on how to employ a MEU is almost non-existent.

In 1996, SAMS conducted a division movement exercise into Macedonia. The dilemma was very realistic -- flow a division into a rapidly deteriorating situation, as quickly as possible, with limited strategic lift, balancing the risk. The immediate problems facing the planners were: NEO, embassy security, airfield seizure, convoy escort, port and airfield security, contracting, traffic control, public affairs, legal, counter-intelligence, reconnaissance, sensor emplacement, civil unrest, material handling, air traffic control (C-130), all simultaneous with lodgment and the need to deter a Corps sized enemy force

north of the border. The scenario placed the MEU already in theater at the beginning of the exercise. Four different planning cells developed four different plans. Yet not one employed the MEU to assist in lodgment or to free TPFDL conflicts.

Some of this was due to service parochialism, but most was just ignorance as to what a MEU could do to help. The first step in becoming joint is knowledge of other service capabilities. The second step is courage to integrate other services during a period of continued drawdown and competing roles. Service pride and budget are not the stakes. American lives and national credibility are.

Major progress occurred on 11 March 1996 when the Commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Center and the Commander of Marine Corps Combat Development Command signed FM 90-31/MCRP 3-3.8 *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations*. This publication contains tactics, techniques, and procedures for the integrated employment of two base cases. These cases focus on the command and control of a notional Army brigade by a MEF, and the command and control of a notional MEF(FWD) by an Army corps. What it does not do is address the most likely scenario -- a U.S. Army JTF with a supporting MEU and/or CVBG.

The world is too large, the conflicts too complex, and the options too few to focus on single service options. The challenge demands we do more than involve independent services in the same theater. Future success hinges on true interoperability of forces through the integration of assets and capabilities. Given CONUS basing, the forward deployed MAGTF is an ace in the hole waiting to be played by Army planners. No other




capability in the national inventory offers more to a JFC attempting lodgment in a tomorrow's flashpoint.

## APPENDIX A --ABBREVIATIONS

AAV (amphibious assault vehicle)  
ACE (air combat element)  
ALO (air liaison officer)  
ANGLICO (air/naval gunfire liaison company)  
AOA (amphibious objective area)  
ARG (amphibious ready group)  
ATF (amphibious task force)  
BLT (battalion landing team)  
Bn (battalion)  
C2 (command and control)  
C3 (command, control, and communications)  
C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence)  
C4 (command, control, communication, and computers)  
C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence)  
C4I2 (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and interoperability)  
CA (civil affairs)  
CAS (close air support)  
CATF (commander amphibious task force)  
CE (command element)  
CINC (combat commander in chief)  
CIT (counter-intelligence team)  
CJTF (commander joint task force)  
CLF (commander landing force)  
CONUS (continental United States)  
CS (combat support)  
CSS (combat service support)  
CSSD (combat service support detachment)  
CSSE (combat service support element)  
CVBG (aircraft carrier battle group)  
DASC (direct air support center)  
FAC (forward air controller)  
FACP (forward air control party)  
FARP (forward arming and refueling point)  
FIIU (force imagery interpretation unit)  
FMF (Fleet Marine Force)  
FSC (fire support coordinator)  
FSCC (fire support coordination center)  
FSSG (force service support group)  
F/W (fixed wing)  
GCE (ground combat element)  
HST (helicopter support team)  
IED (improved explosive devise)

IHR (in-extremis hostage rescue)  
ITT (interrogation translator team)  
JFC (joint forces commander)  
JTF (joint task force)  
LAAD (low altitude air defense)  
LAR (light armored reconnaissance)  
LAV (light armored vehicle)  
MAG (Marine Air Group)  
MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force)  
MAW (Marine Air Wing)  
MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force)  
MEF(FWD) (Marine Expeditionary Force Forward)  
MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit)  
MOUT (military operations in urbanized terrain)  
MP (military police)  
MPF (maritime prepositioning force)  
MPS (maritime prepositioning ships)  
MPSRON (maritime prepositioning ship squadron)  
MRC (major regional conflict)  
MSPF (maritime special purpose force)  
MSSG (Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group)  
NEO (noncombatant evacuation operations)  
NGF (naval gunfire)  
PHIBRON (amphibious squadron)  
POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants)  
RADBN (radio battalion)  
REIN (reinforcing)  
SCAMP (sensor control and management platoon)  
SPMAGTF (Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force)  
TOPO (topographical platoon)  
TPFDL (time phased force deployment list)  
UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle)

## APPENDIX B -- MEU ORGANIZATION



## **APPENDIX C -- TWENTY-ONE MEU(SOC) MISSIONS**

- 1. AMPHIBIOUS RAID**
- 2. MOBILE TRAINING TEAM**
- 3. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)**
- 4. SHOW OF FORCE**
- 5. CIVIC ACTION**
- 6. DECEPTION**
- 7. RECOVERY**
- 8. IN-EXTREMIS HOSTAGE RESCUE (IHR)**
- 9. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE**
- 10. LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK**
- 11. SECURITY**
- 12. FIRE SUPPORT CONTROL**
- 13. INITIAL TERMINAL GUIDANCE**
- 14. SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE/ELECTRONIC WARFARE**
- 15. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)**
- 16. AIRFIELD SEIZURE**
- 17. SPECIAL DEMOLITIONS**
- 18. REINFORCEMENT**
- 19. CLANDESTINE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE**
- 20. MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS (MIO)**
- 21. GAS AND OIL PLATFORM OPERATIONS (GOPLAT)**

# **APPENDIX D -- MEU vs MEF(FWD) EQUIPMENT CHART**

	MEU	MPF MEF(FWD)	Amphib MEF(FWD)
M1A1 Tank	4	14	14
AAV	12	109	47
LAV	8	27	33
155mm How (Towed)	4	36	36
81mm Mortar	8	24	24
60mm Mortar	12	36	36
MK19 40mm Gren Launcher	26	114	114
TOW Launcher	8	72	48
Dragon Launcher	24	72	72
.50 cal Machinegun	20	339	138
M-60 Machinegun	50	289	206
Hawk Missile Launcher	0	8	16
Stinger Missile Team	5	45	45
AV-8B Harrier	0	20	40
F/A-18A Hornet	0	24	24
F/A-18D Hornet	0	12	12
EA-6B Intruder	0	6	6
CH-53A/D Sea Stallion	0	0	12
CH-53E Sea Stallion	4	16	16
AH-1W Cobra	4	12	12
CH-46E Sea Knight	12	12	48
UH-1N Huey	4	12	12
KC-130	2	6	6

## APPENDIX E -- AMPHIBIOUS SHIP CHARACTERISTICS

CLASS	LCU	LCAC	TROOPS	DECK SPOTS	OPERATING RMS/ HOSPITAL BEDS	SPEED
USS Wasp (LHD-1)	2	3	1700	9	seven/600**	24kt
USS Tarawa (LHA-1)	4	1	1500	7	five/250	24kt
USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41)	3	4	450	2	one/eight	20kt
USS Harpers Ferry (LSD-49)	1	2	450	1	one/eight	20kt
USS Anchorage (LSD-36)	1/3*	3	450	1	one/eight	20kt
USS Austin (LPD-4)	1	1	500	2	?	20kt
LPD-17 (Projected)	1	2	700	2	?	?

\* LCU capacity with Mezzanine Deck removed.

\*\*Berthing from disembarked Marines can allow an additional 536 bed cases. Only hospital ships Mercy and Comfort have greater capacity to handle casualties.

## ENDNOTES

1. Department of the Navy, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea -- A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore*. Washington, DC, (1996), 4.
2. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, DC, (1996), ii.
3. Ibid., ii.
4. Ibid., iii.
5. National Defense University, Institute For National Strategic Studies' *Strategic Assessment 1997 -- Flashpoints and Force Structure* lists DOD's 1996 budget as 254 billion, down from 386 in 1987. It projects budgets beyond 1997 to 2002 as 250 billion or less.
6. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995*. Washington, DC, (1996), ii-iii.
7. National Defense University, Institute For National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1997 -- Flashpoints and Force Structure*. Washington, DC, (1997), 11.
8. Ibid., 1-11.
9. Ibid., 3-3 thru 3-5.
10. US Marine Corps, FMFM 1-2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*. Washington DC, (1991), 1-1.
11. Herbert Rosinski, *The Development of Naval Thought*. (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1977), ix-xvi.
12. Department of the Navy, *FORWARD ... From The Sea*. Washington DC, (1992): 3.
13. Ibid., 5.
14. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC, (1993), 15.
15. Department of the Navy, *FORWARD ... From The Sea*. Washington, DC, (1992), 4.
16. Ibid., 4.



17. US Marine Corps, FMFM 1-2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*. Washington, DC, (1991), 3-10.
18. Ibid., 3-10.
19. US Marine Corps, FMFM 1, *Warfighting*. Washington, DC, (1989), 5-60.
20. Ibid., 59.
21. Ibid., 60.
22. Glenn Wagner, "Is the Marine Corps' Doctrine of Maneuver Warfare Synergetic With the Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations?" (Thesis, Naval War College, 1992), 1.
23. Department of the Navy, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea -- A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore*. Washington, DC, (1995), 6.
24. Ibid., 6.
25. Robert Debs Heinl Jr, *Victory at High Tide -- The Inchon-Seoul Campaign* (The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979), 3-87.
26. Department of the Navy, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea -- A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore*. Washington, DC, (1995), 14.
27. US Marine Corps, FMFM 1-2, *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*. Washington, DC, (1991), 4-1.
28. Ibid., 4-2.
29. US Marine Corps, MCRP 3-3.8, *Army and Marine Corps Integration In Joint Operations*. Washington, DC, (1996), 1-3 and 1-4.
30. Donald R. Bates, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Throughput Analysis of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Slice Offload, (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School 1994), 1-15.
31. US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Brief, "USMC -- Roles, Functions, Organization, Capabilities, Doctrine", 1996 (?), copy from the Marine Liaison Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
32. The PHIBRON is the Navy commander (commodore) and his staff who exercise command and control over the ships in the ARG (i.e. PHIBRON is a C2 organization and AGR is a group of ships). The commodore and the MEU commander are co-equal in

planning. Each enjoys a senior decision-making status depending on whether it is a navy (sea/ship) related decision or a land (all the MEU's 21 missions) related decision. It is critical these two commanders and their staffs learn to work together without friction or competition.

33. US Marine Corps, MCO 3502, *Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Predeployment Training Program (MEU(SOC) PTP)*. Washington, DC, (1995): 3.

34. Ibid., 2.

35. LtCol Chuck McGohey USMC, Special Operations Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps. Interview by author, 28 March 1997.

36. There are three MPS positioned around the world. Each MPS is comprised of five black bottom ships with roll-on-roll off vehicles and supplies. The MPS has the ability to off load dockside or in-stream via causeways. One MPS is capable of outfitting a reinforced infantry regiment (roughly, think BLT x 3). One of the MEU's missions is to secure off load sites/deep water ports for MPS to link-up with a fly-in force.

37. US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Brief, "USMC -- Roles, Functions, Organizations, Capabilities, Doctrine". (1996): 28.

38. These are the four standard amphibious ships in the Navy inventory. The LHA and LHD are the largest amphibious ships, each carrying 1200-1500 Marines and all the MEU aviation assets (airframes and aviation maintenance). They serve as the command ship for the ARG, and as such, have the most sophisticated command, control, and communication (C3) packages. Both are capable of simultaneous flight deck operations and well deck operations. The LHA has seven deck spots and the LHD has nine. The LHA well deck carries four LCU landing craft. The LHD is capable of carrying either four LCUs or three LCACs. The LPD is the current mid-sized amphibious ship in the Navy. It has a dry well deck and a two helicopter spot flight deck. Due to internal command and control, and personnel limitations, it usually can not conduct simultaneous flight deck and well deck operations. Capable of embarking 500 Marines, it has sufficient C3 to conduct advanced force operations or a subsidiary amphibious landing. The LSD is a dry well ship with a one helicopter spot deck. Designed to carry four LCACs in its dry well deck, it can also billet 300 Marines. It has an adequate C3 capability, though more limited than the LPD.

39. Department of the Navy, *Force 2001 -- A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy*. Washington, DC, (1995): 69-71.

40. LtCol Chuck McGohey USMC, Special Operations Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps. Interview by author, 28 March 1997.

41. US Marine Corps, Amphibious Warfare School Publication A(C)1300, "Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control Organization". Quantico, VA, (1996): 9-11.
42. Ibid., 9-10.
43. Ibid., 9-8.
44. Ibid., 9-6.
45. Ibid., 9-4.
46. From April through June of 1996, EUCOM tasked 22nd MEU(SOC) with the mission of JTF HQ in Operation Assured Response (NEOs in Liberia and Central African Republic). II MEF augmented 22nd MEU(SOC) with additional personnel and communications equipment to facilitate this mission. This is documented in a Marine Forces Atlantic, CNA Field Memorandum: *22d MEU as JTF Assured Response: The MEU as a JTF Enabler*. (1996): 24-26.
47. US Marine Corps, MCO 3502, "Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Predeployment Training Program (MEU(SOC)PTP)". Washington, DC, (1995): 6.
48. US Marine Corps, 22nd MEU, "22nd MEU Standing Operating Procedures for Special Operations (SOSOP)", (1994): 6.
49. Ibid., 8.
50. Examples from 22nd MEU's Mediterranean deployment in 1994.
51. CRRC is a rubber boat with reinforced floor panels and twin 35 hp outboard motors. It is capable of launch and recovery from over the horizon (14-20 miles) in sea state 2. Each boat carries 10 combat loaded Marines. The coxswains stay with the boat once the raid force is landed.
52. US Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic, 22nd MEU, "Standing Operating Procedures for Special Operations (SOSOP)", (1994).
53. Ibid.
54. TRAP is executed on a two hour string since it is executed over foreign soil, and the pilot's survival/capture is at stake. There is one additional requirement -- confirmation of the pilot's location (not crash site location) within 1km prior to launch. Due to this timeline, the TRAP force's equipment and weapons remain staged in the well deck

anytime there is potential for the mission. In addition, the designated helicopter is rigged with FAST rope and necessary safety equipment.

55. MSPF includes a small command element, the force recon platoon, R&S from the BLT, and a covering force platoon from the BLT. The force recon platoon is the assault force. They are trained in close quarters battle (CQB) in order to conduct discriminating shooting inside a building. The R&S platoon has a highly skilled day/night sniper capability. The covering force is trained to isolate the target area or to trail the force recon shooters depending on the size of the target and the enemy situation.

56. Several GOPLATs in the Persian Gulf were used like this during Desert Shield.

57. The PHIBRON's NavSpecWar Det includes both SEALs and a small boat unit (SBU) team. The SBU has two 25 foot boston whalers capable of high speed surface insert and extract.

58. In 1983, then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger directed each service review existing special operations capabilities. The MEU(SOC) program was the Marine Corps' response to this task; however, it did not initially include an inextremis capability for land and maritime platforms. In 1986 terrorists seized the Greek cruise ship Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt. President Reagan asked General P.X. Kelly (Commandant of the Marine Corps) how the MEU(SOC) on station could help. The Commandant had to admit that they could do little. The combination of these two propelled the Marine Corps to develop an inextremis capability.

59. United States Marine Corps, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 2nd Marine Division. "Standard Operating Procedures for Special Operations". (1994), 1-1 through 1-145.

60. George P. Fenton, "MEU(SOC) -- At the Operational Level in MOOTW", (Thesis, Naval War College, 1995), 1.

61. Admiral Smith was the CINCEUR designated commander for U.S. contingency operations in Bosnia. Admiral Smith's headquarters was in Naples, Italy.

62. The author was commanding officer of BLT 1/6 during this deployment and was who the MEU Commander tasked with producing the plan.

63. The Bihac pocket represented a small area in northwest Bosnia that had been under seize by Serbia forces for over six months. The Bangladesh battalion (BANGBAT) was the UN force positioned to protect the town of Bihac from being over run. The Serbians had stopped previous efforts by UN forces to reinforce/supply the BANGBAT and Bihac. The BANGBAT was the least combat capable of all the UN forces in Bosnia. They were 450 men strong and had barley survived the winter. They only had one weapon per every three soldiers and ammo for every other weapon. It had been two months since supplies

had been able to get through to Bihac. The Serbs were threatening to renew offensive operations and overrun Bihac. Guidance was the BANGBAT had to be extracted prior to a renewed Serbia offensive. The closest airfield to Bihac was 100 miles away.

64. Department of the Navy, *1995 Posture Statement -- The Navy-Marine Corps Team*. Washington, DC, (1995), 5.

65. In 1994, 24th MEU returned from a six month Mediterranean deployment. Haiti was heating up and CINCLANT wanted a MEU deployed to the Caribbean as a contingency option/show of force. Less than thirty days after returning to CONUS, 24th MEU re-deployed and remained in the Caribbean for over 90 days. 24th MEU was replaced by the SPMAGTF that eventually participated in the Haiti invasion.

66. See Endnote 63 above.

67. D. E. Granger, "The Marine Expeditionary Unit: A limited Conventional Response Force: Not a SOF Substitute." (Thesis, Naval War College, 1994), 19.

68. US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Brief, "USMC Roles, Functions, Organization, Capabilities, Doctrine". (1996): 11.

69. US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, *The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance*. Washington, DC, (1995), A-1.

70. Department of the Navy, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea*. Washington, DC, (1996), 5.

71. Normal steaming speed for amphibious ships is 17-20 knots. At 17 knots per hour, a ship can cover 200 statute miles in 10 hours. 200 miles left and 200 miles right equates to a 400 mile over night threat.

72. George P. Fenton, "MEU(SOC) -- At the Operational Level in MOOTW", (Thesis, Naval War College, 1995), 2.

73. US Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic. LantO 4400, "Standardization of MEU(SOC) Unit Equipment Report." (1996), 4-19.

74. A. Bynum, "The Marine Expeditionary Unit: Can It Support the Humanitarian Mission?" (Thesis, Marine Corps Communication Officer School, 1993), 14-6.

75. US Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts & Issues 95 -- A Certain Force*. Washington, DC, (1996), 3-3.

76. Mass casualty is a mission requiring a cordon element to secure the site, litter bearers, security to escort the casualties, and medical triage teams to categorize and treat patients. A situation with five or more casualties is considered a mass casualty.

77. When the ARG shipping is split and sent in different direction. This obviously offers wider coverage, but substantially reduces the MEU's capabilities. MEU assets on each ship are not individually self sufficient. However, in order to support peacetime exercises simultaneous to real world contingencies, split-ARG operations are frequently conducted, particularly in the Mediterranean. Every ship does have Marines capable of conducting a security related mission.

78. Operation Desert Shield (1990) and Operation Vigilant Warrior (1994), both involving a build up of forces in Southwest Asia.

79. Department of the Navy, *1995 Posture Statement -- The Navy - Marine Corps Team*. Washington, DC (1995), 13.

80. Evacuee planning factors for a NEO are usually double what the embassy team offers. In other words, if the embassy team says there are 500 evacuees in country, a conservative planning figure would be 1000. This is the planing consideration passed at the MEU(SOC) workshop to MEU/PHIBRON staffs, and is based on after action reports and historical study. The MEU(SOC) workshop is a two week course the MEU and PHIBRON attend together early in the relationship (approximately D-170), where the ground work is laid for planning the 21 MEU(SOC) missions. As such, MEU planners routinely double the evacuee figures provided by the in-country embassy planners.

81. US Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic, CNA Field Memorandum, "22nd MEU as JTF Assured Response: The MEU as a JTF Enabler". Norfolk, VA, (1996), 5.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### **Books**

- Clancey, Tom. *Marine -- A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit*. New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1996.
- Heinl, Robert Debs. *Victory at High Tide -- The Inchon-Seoul Campaign*. The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co of America, 1979.
- Mahoney, Bob and David Bowne Wood. *A Sense of Values: American Warriors in an Uncertain World*. Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1994.
- Rosinski, Herbert. *The Development of Naval Thought*. Newport: Naval War College Press, 1977.

### **Government Publications**

- A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. Washington, DC, 1996.
- Center for Naval Warfare Studies. *Navy's Role in Promoting and Defending U.S. National Interests*. Newport RI, 1995
- Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington DC, 1994.
- Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington DC, 1995.
- Department of Defense. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington DC, 1996.
- Department of Defense. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995*. Washington DC, 1996.
- Department of the Navy. *Force 2001 -- A Program Guide to the US Navy*. Washington DC, 1995.
- Department of the Navy. *Forward ... From The Sea*. Washington DC, 1996.
- Department of the Navy. *Operational Maneuver From The Sea*. Washington DC, 1996.

Department of the Navy. *1995 Posture Statement -- The Navy - Marine Corps Team*. Washington DC, 1995.

Department of Operations. *Foundation of Operational Art in the Naval Service*. Newport, RI, 1995.

Department of Operations. *Operational Maneuver From The Sea: Principles of War Apply*. Newport, RI, 1995.

National Defense University, Institute For National Strategic Studies. *Strategic Accessment 1997 --Flashpoints and Force Structure*. Washington DC, 1997.

United States Marine Corps, Amphibious Warfare School Publication A(C)1300. *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control Organization*. Quantico VA, 1996.

US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps. *31st Commandant's Planning Guidance*. Washington DC, 1995.

US Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Field Manual 1. *Warfighting*. Washington DC, 1989.

US Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-1. *Campaigning*. Washington DC, 1990.

US Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-2. *The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense*. Washington DC, 1991.

US Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Field Manual 1-3. *Tactics*. Washington DC, 1991.

US Marine Corps, Headquarters Marine Corps Brief. *USMC -- Roles, Functions, Organizations, Capabilities, Doctrine*. Washington DC, 1996.

US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 3502. *Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Predeployment Training Program (MEU(SOC) PTP)*. Washington DC, 1995.

US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-3.8. *Army and Marine Corps Integration In Joint Operations*. Washington DC, 1996.

US Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic, CNA Field Memorandum. *22nd MEU as JTF Assured Response: The MEU as a JTF Enabler*. Norfolk VA, 1996.

US Marine Corps, Marine Forces Atlantic, Lant Order 4400. *Standardization of MEU(SOC) Unit Equipment Report*. Norfolk VA, 1996.



US Marine Corps, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 2nd Marine Division. Standing Operating Procedures for Special Operations. Camp Lejeune NC, 1994.

US Marine Corps, 22nd MEU. *Standing Operating Procedures for Special Operations (SOSOP)*. Camp Lejeune NC, 1994.

US Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Concepts & Issues 95 -- A Certain Force*. Washington DC, 1996.

### **Theses and Reports**

Bates, D. R. "Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) throughput Analysis of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Slice Offload." Masters Theses, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1994.

Geortzen, S. L. "Feasibility of the Over-The Horizon Amphibious Assault for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Forces." Masters Theses, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993.

Jerothe, D. J. "Operational Maneuver From the Sea: Principles of War Apply." Theses, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1995.

Kinder, S. P. "Forcible Entry Options: A CINC's Trump Card." Masters Theses, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1994.

Lambert, K. S. "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations -- Plan Now or Pay Later." Masters Theses, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1992.

O'Leary, T. "Foundation of Operational Art in the Naval Service." Masters Theses, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1994.

Qualls, T.F. "MAGTF's and Adaptive Naval Expeditionary Force Packaging: Operational Masterpieces or Failures." Final Report, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1994.

Rauch, D. A. "Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft: Past, Present, and Future." Student Essay, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1987.

Strasser, J. C. "Navy's Role in Promoting and Defending US National Interests." Final Report, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995.

Wagner, G. "Is the Marine Corps Doctrine of Maneuver warfare Synergistic with the Joint Doctrin for Amphibious Operations." Final Report, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1995.

Van Dyke, A.E. "MEU(SOC) and CINC's." Final Report, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1993.

### Articles

Admire, John H. "Joint Operations: Marine Corps Capabilities and Contributions." *Marine Corps Gazette* 74, no. 8 (1990): 83-89.

Kelly, John J. "Beyond the Cold War: The Future of U.S. Amphibious Operations." *Sea Power* 35, no. 5 (1992): 36-38.

McGee, Russell O. "31st MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) Issues: An Illustration of Marine Overcommittment." *Marine Corps Gazette* 78, no. 7 (1994): 51-52.

Millett, Allan R. "Why the Army and Marine Corps Should Be Friends." *Parameters* 24, no. 4 (1994): 30-40.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare." *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 4 (1994): 45-50.

\_\_\_\_\_. "US Marines are Old Hands at Humanitarian Intervention." *Armed Forces Journal International* 130, no. 7 (1993): 42-.

Tailyour, R.S. "Future of Amphibious Warfare." *Rusi Journal* 136, no. 1 (1991): 33-37.

Williams, Thomas W. "MEU(SOC) (Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Unit): The Jewel in the Crown of our Corps." *Marine Corps Gazette* 78, no. 3 (1994): 30-32.